Aggregate Implications of a Credit Crunch by Francisco J. Buera & Benjamin Moll
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We thank Manuel Amador, Marios Angeletos, Roland Bénabou, Markus Brunnermeier, Mike Golosov,
Urban Jermann, Patrick Kehoe, Guido Lorenzoni, Stephen Redding, Richard Rogerson, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg
and seminar participants at Princeton, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Rutgers, Minneapolis
Fed, Wharton, Georgetown, NYU, Boston University, MIT, Ohio State, ASU, Université de Montréal
and 2011 NBER Summer Institute and Minnesota Workshop in Macroeconomic Theory for useful
comments. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2012 by Francisco J. Buera and Benjamin Moll. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to
exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.Aggregate Implications of a Credit Crunch
Francisco J. Buera and Benjamin Moll
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of firm owners. These results highlight the limitations of using representative agent models to identify
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Abstract
We take an oﬀ-the-shelf model with ﬁnancial frictions and heterogeneity, and study
the mapping from a credit crunch, modeled as a shock to collateral constraints, to sim-
ple aggregate wedges. We study three variants of this model that only diﬀer in the form
of underlying heterogeneity. We ﬁnd that in all three model variants a credit crunch
shows up as a diﬀerent wedge: eﬃciency, investment, and labor wedges. Furthermore,
all three model variants have an undistorted Euler equation for the aggregate of ﬁrm
owners. These results highlight the limitations of using representative agent models to
identify sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations.
Keywords: ﬁnancial frictions, business cycles, heterogeneity, aggregation
What are the sources of aggregate ﬂuctuations? To answer this question, macroe-
conomists often rely on aggregate data and the representative agent framework, thereby
abstracting from underlying heterogeneity in the economy. One common approach is to use
aggregate productivity shocks, preference shocks, or more generally wedges on the optimal-
ity conditions of the representative agent to account for aggregate ﬂuctuations. An obvious
advantage of this approach is its simplicity, and it has, for example, been used to infer the
relative importance of ﬁnancial frictions as a driver of business cycles.1 To evaluate the
usefulness of this exercise, we take an oﬀ-the-shelf model with ﬁnancial frictions and het-
erogeneity, and study the mapping from a credit crunch, modeled as a shock to collateral
constraints, to simple aggregate eﬃciency, investment and labor wedges. We study three
variants of this model that only diﬀer in the form of underlying heterogeneity.
∗Buera: UCLA and NBER, fjbuera@econ.ucla.edu. Moll: Princeton University, moll@princeton.edu. We
thank Manuel Amador, Marios Angeletos, Roland B´ enabou, Markus Brunnermeier, Mike Golosov, Urban
Jermann, Patrick Kehoe, Guido Lorenzoni, Stephen Redding, Richard Rogerson, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg
and seminar participants at Princeton, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Rutgers, Minneapolis Fed,
Wharton, Georgetown, NYU, Boston University, MIT, Ohio State, ASU, Universit´ e de Montr´ eal and 2011
NBER Summer Institute and Minnesota Workshop in Macroeconomic Theory for useful comments.
1Examples include Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007), Smets and Wouters (2007), Ohanian (2010),
and Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010, 2011). We discuss these and other examples in more depth
in the “Related Literature” section at the end of this introduction.Our ﬁrst result is that in all three model variants a credit crunch shows up as a diﬀerent
wedge. A credit crunch shows up as an eﬃciency wedge if there is heterogeneity in the
productivity of ﬁnal goods producers. In contrast, it shows up as an investment wedge if
we replace heterogeneity in the productivity of ﬁnal goods producers with heterogeneous
investment costs. Finally, a credit crunch shows up as a labor wedge in an economy with
heterogeneous recruitment costs. Our second result is that all three model variants have an
undistorted Euler equation for the aggregate of ﬁrm owners. We show that this is due to
a general equilibrium eﬀect and argue that investment wedges from ﬁnancial frictions are
largely an artifact of partial equilibrium reasoning. Taken together, our two results imply
that it is impossible to identify a credit crunch from standard aggregate data like output,
labor and investment.
Our model features entrepreneurs that have access to three constant returns to scale tech-
nologies: a technology to produce ﬁnal goods, another technology to transform ﬁnal goods
into capital, and a third technology for transforming recruitment eﬀort today into workers
in the following period. The three model variants we study only diﬀer in the technology
in which entrepreneurs are heterogeneous. In all three model variants, entrepreneurs face
collateral constraints that limit their ability to acquire capital or recruit workers.
In addition to entrepreneurs, the economy is populated by a continuum of homogeneous
workers. We consider two alternative assumptions regarding workers’ access to asset markets:
the case of ﬁnancial autarky and the case where they are allowed to save in a risk-free
bond. The ﬁrst assumption allows for a sharper theoretical characterization of the model’s
transition dynamics. We also consider an extension where workers face shocks to their
eﬃciency units of labor.
We ﬁrst study the model variant with heterogeneous ﬁnal goods productivity, and no
heterogeneity in investment and recruitment costs. Aggregate TFP evolves endogenously as
a function of the collateral constraint and the distribution of entrepreneurial wealth. Under
the assumption of logarithmic preferences, a credit crunch is exactly isomorphic to a TFP
shock. In addition, while individual investment decisions are distorted, aggregate investment
can be characterized in terms of the Euler equation of a representative entrepreneur that
is undistorted. This result is due to a general equilibrium eﬀect: in response to a credit
crunch, the interest rate adjusts in such a way that bonds remain in zero net supply; this
implies that the aggregate return to wealth equals the aggregate return to capital, and the
credit crunch is entirely absorbed by a decrease in TFP. While these results are exact only
for the case of logarithmic utility, we show by means of numerical simulations that they hold
approximately for the case of general Constant Relative Risk Aversion preferences under
standard parameter values.
2Once we aggregate entrepreneurs, the economy consist of two types of agents, a rep-
resentative entrepreneur and a representative worker. If workers are in ﬁnancial autarky,
an investment wedge is needed to characterize aggregate data in terms of a representative
agent. However, we show that this investment wedge is negative: a credit crunch looks like
an episode in which investment is subsidized, not taxed. Furthermore, we show by means of
simulations that the investment is negligible under the alternative assumption that workers
face idiosyncratic labor income risk and save in a risk-free bond.
Having studied our ﬁrst model variant with heterogeneous ﬁnal goods productivity, we
consider two variants with heterogeneity along two other dimensions. In the second model
variant entrepreneurs face heterogeneous investment costs – meaning they diﬀer in their tech-
nologies to transform ﬁnal goods into investment goods – but are homogeneous in their ﬁnal
goods production and recruitment technologies. In the third model economy entrepreneurs
face heterogeneous recruitment costs – meaning they diﬀer in their technologies to transform
recruitment eﬀort today into workers in the following period.
In these model variants, a credit crunch shows up as an investment wedge and a labor
wedge respectively. While a credit crunch maps into diﬀerent wedges in all three model
variants, the logic is always the same: a credit crunch worsens the allocation of resources
across heterogeneous entrepreneurs and this misallocation decreases the average eﬃciency
of the technology in which entrepreneurs are heterogeneous. In the case of heterogeneous
investment technologies, for instance, a credit crunch leads to a worse aggregate investment
technology. This shows up as an investment wedge even though the credit crunch has
no direct eﬀect on aggregate investment, if the productivity of the aggregate investment
technology is not accounted for. A similar intuition applies to the model with heterogeneous
recruitment technologies.
Related Literature Our paper is most closely related to the literature that uses wedges
in representative agent models to summarize aggregate data (Mulligan, 2002; Chari, Kehoe
and McGrattan, 2007).2 Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan ﬁnd that the investment wedge did
not ﬂuctuate much over the business cycle in postwar aggregate data. They show that in
popular theories such as Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1998), ﬁnancial frictions manifest themselves primarily as investment wedges and conclude
that such theories are therefore not promising for the study of business cycles. This ﬁnding
has been challenged by Christiano and Davis (2006), Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti
(2010, 2011), mainly on the grounds that changes in the empirical implementation of Chari
2The idea of using such wedges to draw inferences about the sources of aggregate ﬂuctuations goes back
at least to Parkin (1988) who studies the labor wedge.
3et al.’s procedure overturn the result that the investment wedge did not ﬂuctuate much.3
Our paper instead questions the usefulness of wedges on a more basic level. Wedges
have been used for at least two purposes. First, they have been used as a “diagnostic” for
identifying the primitive shocks driving business cycles (Cole and Ohanian, 2002; Ohanian,
2010). This approach is invalidated by our ﬁnding that the same shock – a credit crunch –
shows up as a diﬀerent wedge depending on the form of underlying heterogeneity. Second,
wedges have been used as a “guide” to build better models: given knowledge of a speciﬁc
primitive shock, say a credit crunch, the observed wedges are used to narrow down the class
of mechanisms through which this shock leads to economic ﬂuctuations. This more nuanced
approach is for example advocated by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007). In this sense
a wedge is “just another moment” that a model can be calibrated to. We agree with this
characterization. However, it is then unclear why wedges would have any superiority over
other moments.4 Further, micro rather than aggregate data may be better suited to narrow
down the mechanisms through which a given shock operates.5
A growing recent literature argues that ﬁnancial frictions can cause aggregate produc-
tivity losses (Khan and Thomas, 2010; Gilchrist et al., 2010) or manifest themselves in a
labor wedge (Jermann and Quadrini, 2009; Arellano, Bai and Kehoe, 2011).6 We view our
paper as complementary to these, but novel along two dimensions. First, we stress that
one main reason why ﬁnancial frictions may show up in diﬀerent aggregate variables is their
interaction with diﬀerent forms of underlying heterogeneity. It should be clear that this is a
generic feature of all models with ﬁnancial frictions, a point we emphasize by working with a
relatively standard and oﬀ-the-shelf model in which we have mainly enriched the underlying
heterogeneity. Second, we argue that the intuition that ﬁnancial frictions should manifest
3Christiano and Davis (2006) show that this result is, for example, not robust to the introduction of
investment adjustment costs or to an alternative formulation of the investment wedge in terms of a tax on
the gross return on capital rather than a tax on the price of investment goods. Justiniano, Primiceri and
Tambalotti (2010, 2011) view the data through the lens of a “New Keynesian” model instead of an RBC
model, and argue that most business cycle ﬂuctuations are driven by shocks to the marginal eﬃciency of
investment, the equivalent of an investment wedge. They then point out that these investment shocks might
proxy for ﬁnancial frictions.
4For instance, why is it more appealing to match the labor wedge rather than, say, aggregate hours worked
and/or the unemployment rate?
5In our framework, for instance, observed wedges in combination with knowledge of a credit crunch
could, in principle, be used to assess the relative importance of our three forms of underlying heterogeneity.
However, the statement “if only there were a credit crunch so that we could ﬁnd out where the heterogeneity
is” seems backwards at best. Examining micro data is the much more obvious strategy for identifying sources
of heterogeneity.
6That ﬁnancial frictions cause aggregate productivity losses is a popular theme in the growth and devel-
opment literature. Among others, see Banerjee and Duﬂo (2005), Jeong and Townsend (2007), Buera and
Shin (2010), Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2010), Moll (2010). Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2010) and Moll (2010)
also argue that aggregate capital accumulation – as measured by the steady state capital-to-output ratio –
is unaﬀected in their models with heterogeneous ﬁnal goods producers.
4themselves as investment wedges is an artifact of partial equilibrium reasoning. This follows
from our result that our three model variants have an undistorted Euler equation for the
aggregate of ﬁrm owners.7
None of our criticisms are special to wedges. They apply one-for-one to other papers
that try to learn about the sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations using a representative
agent framework and aggregate data alone, say most of the “New Keynesian” literature
as exempliﬁed by Smets and Wouters (2007) and Gal´ ı, Smets and Wouters (2011).8 In
raising these concerns, our paper has much in common with the work by Chang and Kim
(2007) and Chang, Kim and Schorfheide (2010) who examine heterogeneous-agent economies
with incomplete capital markets and indivisible labor. They show that a macroeconomist
examining aggregate time-series generated by their model with neither distortions nor labor-
supply shocks, would conclude that their economy features a time-varying labor wedge
or preference shock, and that therefore abstracting from cross-sectional heterogeneity can
potentially mislead policy predictions. See Geweke (1985) and Blinder (1987) for earlier
critiques of representative agent models when heterogeneity is important.
Following Bernanke and Gertler (1989), a large theoretical literature studies the role of
credit market imperfections in business cycle ﬂuctuations. Most papers are similar to ours
in that they study heterogeneous entrepreneurs subject to borrowing constraints. In light
of our ﬁnding that the exact form of heterogeneity matters, we note that most of them
assume that entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their investment technologies (Carlstrom
and Fuerst, 1997; Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1998; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, 2005,
2008; Christiano, Motto and Rostagno, 2009; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010; Kurlat, 2010).9
Models with entrepreneurs that are heterogeneous in their ﬁnal goods productivity are rarer.
Exceptions are the papers by Kiyotaki (1998), Kocherlakota (2009), Bassetto, Cagetti and
De Nardi (2010), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011), Gilchrist et al. (2010) and Khan and
7Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) themselves feature an example of an economy with ﬁnancial frictions
that show up as both an investment wedge and an eﬃciency wedge (see their Proposition 1), and in a knife-
edge case, only as an eﬃciency wedge. We view our results as substantial generalizations of theirs because
our results hold in an oﬀ-the-shelf model of ﬁnancial frictions and we clarify that the absence of an investment
wedge should be considered a generic feature of general equilibrium models with collateral constraints rather
than a knife-edge case.
8Smets and Wouters (2007) use aggregate time series and a representative agent model with various
structural shocks, including a risk premium shock and an investment-speciﬁc technology shock, to understand
the sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations. Similarly, Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011) argue that a “ﬁnancial
friction wedge” is the key to understanding the recession of 2007 to 2009.
9Kiyotaki and Moore (1997, 2005, 2008) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) make the assumption that
each period “investment opportunities” arrive randomly to some exogenous fraction of entrepreneurs. Only
entrepreneurs with an “investment opportunity” can acquire new investment goods; others cannot. In our
framework, this corresponds to an extreme, binary, form of heterogeneous investment costs: either investment
costs are zero, corresponding to the arrival of an investment opportunity, or inﬁnite.
5Thomas (2010).10
An important distinctive feature of our model is an undistorted Euler equation for the
aggregate of ﬁrm owners. In most of the literature, this result does not hold because it is
assumed that borrowers and lenders diﬀer in their rates of time preference so as to guar-
antee that entrepreneurs are constrained in equilibrium. Instead, we explicitly model the
stochastic evolution of the productivity of entrepreneurs, and their decision to be either ac-
tive and demand capital, or inactive and supply their savings to other entrepreneurs. Our
analysis shows that these alternative modeling assumptions have very diﬀerent aggregate
implications.11
One of the main contributions of this paper is to derive analytic expressions for the
various wedges despite the rich underlying heterogeneity. To deliver such tractability, we
build on work by Angeletos (2007) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2008). Their insight is that
heterogeneous agent economies remain tractable if individual production functions feature
constant returns to scale because then individual policy rules are linear in individual wealth.12
Our paper is organized according to the diﬀerent dimensions of heterogeneity we consider:
heterogeneous productivity (Section 1), heterogeneous investment costs (Section 2), and
heterogeneous recruitment costs (Section 3). In Section 4, we discuss how the use of more
disaggregated data might allow for identiﬁcation of a credit crunch. Section 5 is a conclusion.
1 Benchmark Model: Heterogeneous Productivity
1.1 Preferences and Technology
Time is discrete. There is a continuum of entrepreneurs that are indexed by i ∈ [0,1].
Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their productivity, zit, their capital holdings, kit and
their debt, dit. Each period, entrepreneurs draw a new productivity from a distribution
ψ(z). Importantly, this productivity shock is not only iid across entrepreneurs but also iid
10Our paper and the majority of the literature focus on credit constraints on the production side of
the economy, more precisely those faced by entrepreneurs. In contrast, Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) and
Midrigan and Philippon (2011) focus on borrowing constraints at the household level and Gertler and Karadi
(2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) on those faced by ﬁnancial intermediaries.
11In addition to assuming that individuals diﬀer in their discount factors, some of the papers in the
literature (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997; Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist,
1998) assume that entrepreneurs are identical ex-ante and only heterogeneous ex-post and that there is a
real cost of default. This assumption implies that entrepreneurs face a wedge between their ex-ante cost of
funds and the risk-free rate.
12In contrast to the present paper, Angeletos focuses on the role of “uninsured idiosyncratic investment
risk” and does not feature collateral constraints (except for the so-called “natural” borrowing constraint).
Kiyotaki and Moore analyze a similar setup with borrowing constraints but their focus is on understanding
the implications of monetary factors for aggregate ﬂuctuations.
6over time.13 We assume a law of large numbers so the share of entrepreneurs experiencing









Each entrepreneur owns a private ﬁrm which uses kit units of capital and lit units of labor
to produce




units of output, where α ∈ (0,1). Entrepreneurs also have access to the following linear
technology to transform ﬁnal goods into investment goods
kit+1 = xit + (1 − δ)kit (3)
where xit is investment and δ is the depreciation rate.







t ) − v(Lt)] (4)
where u is as in (1) and v is increasing and convex. For most of our results, we restrict the
analysis to the case where workers do not have access to assets, and therefore, are hand-
to-mouth consumers. We later present numerical results for the case where workers have
the same preferences as (4), can accumulate risk-free bonds, and face idiosyncratic labor
endowment shocks.
1.2 Budgets
Entrepreneurs hire workers in a competitive labor market at a wage wt. They also trade in
risk-free bonds. Denote by dit the stock of bonds issued by an entrepreneur, that is his debt.
When dit < 0 the entrepreneur is a net lender. The budget constraint is
cit + xit = yit − wtlit − (1 + rt)dit + dit+1. (5)
Entrepreneurs face borrowing constraints
dit+1 ≤ θtkit+1, θt ∈ [0,1]. (6)
This formulation of capital market imperfections is analytically convenient. It says that at
most a fraction θt of next period’s capital stock can be externally ﬁnanced. Or alternatively,
13In appendix C we analyze the case where productivity is persistent. The conclusions for the case of
logarithmic utility function are unaﬀected by relaxing the assumption that shocks are iid over time.
7the down payment on debt used to ﬁnance capital has to be at least a fraction 1 − θt of the
capital stock. Diﬀerent underlying frictions can give rise to such borrowing constraints, for
example limited commitment. Finally, note that by varying θt, we can trace out all degrees
of eﬃciency of capital markets; θt = 1 corresponds to a perfect capital market, and θt = 0
to the case where it is completely shut down. The implications of variations in θt over the
business cycle for aggregate GDP and capital are the main theme of this paper.
Timing: In order for there to be an interesting role for credit markets, an entrepreneur’s
productivity next period, zt+1, is revealed at the end of period t, before the entrepreneur
issues his debt dt+1. That is, entrepreneurs can borrow to ﬁnance investment corresponding
to their new productivity. Besides introducing a more interesting role for credit markets, a
second purpose of this assumption is to eliminate “uninsured idiosyncratic investment risk”.
This is the focus of Angeletos (2007) and is well understood.







it − wtlit (7)
Maximizing out over labor, we obtain the following simple and linear expression for proﬁts:






This implies that the budget constraint of an entrepreneur reduces to
cit + kit+1 = zitπtkit + (1 − δ)kit − (1 + rt)dit + dit+1. (9)
1.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is deﬁned in the usual way. That is, an equilibrium are
sequences of prices {rt,wt}∞
t=0, and corresponding quantities such that (i) entrepreneurs
maximize (1) subject to (6) and (9), taking as given {rt,wt}∞
t=0, and (ii) markets clear at all
points in time:
 
ditdi = 0, (10)
 
litdi = L. (11)
Summing up entrepreneurs’ and workers’ budget constraints and using these market
clearing conditions, we also obtain the aggregate resource constraints of the economy which
we ﬁnd useful to state here.






Here, Kt,Yt and Xt are the aggregate capital stock, output and investment. Ct is aggregate
consumption which is the sum of total consumption by entrepreneurs, CE
t , and workers, CW
t .
1.4 Aggregate Wedges
The main goal of this paper is to study the mapping from a credit crunch to aggregate
wedges. We follow the literature, in particular Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007), and
deﬁne these wedges as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 Consider aggregate data {Kt,Lt,Yt,Ct}∞
t=0 generated by our model economy.




t . The labor wedge, τLt, is deﬁned by
v′(Lt)
u′(Ct)




Finally, the investment wedge, τXt, is deﬁned by
u






+ (1 − δ)(1 + τXt+1)
 
, all t. (15)
These wedges have the natural interpretation of productivity, and labor and investment taxes
in a representative agent economy with resource constraint (12), Cobb-Douglas aggregate
production function Yt = AtKα
t L
1−α
t and preferences of the representative consumer given by
 ∞
t=0 βt[u(Ct) − v(Lt)]. Equation (14) has the interpretation of the labor supply and labor
demand conditions with the labor wedge corresponding to a labor income tax. Equation
(15) has the interpretation of the Euler equation of the representative consumer and the
investment wedge, τXt, then resembles a tax rate on investment.14
In our economy, by assumption only entrepreneurs invest; workers only supply labor. In
answering the question whether aggregate investment is distorted, it will therefore sometimes
be useful to examine what we term the entrepreneurial investment wedge. This object is
analogous to the investment wedge just deﬁned, but uses only aggregate data on quantities
pertaining to entrepreneurs. The deﬁnition of a worker labor wedge will be similarly useful
below.
14More precisely, consider the following competitive equilibrium in this economy. The representative
consumer maximizes his utility function subject to the budget constraint
Ct + (1 + τXt)Xt = (1 − τLt)wtL + RtKt + Tt
and the capital accumulation law Kt+1 = Xt + (1 − δ)Kt, where Rt is the rental rate and Tt are lump-sum
transfers. Equation (15) is the corresponding Euler equation. Further, a representative ﬁrm maximizes
proﬁts given by AtKα
t L1−α − wtL − RtKt so Rt = αYt/Kt and wt = (1 − α)Yt/Lt. Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan (2007) term this the “benchmark prototype economy”.
9Deﬁnition 2 Consider aggregate data {Kt,Yt,CE
t }∞
t=0 generated by the model economy. The
entrepreneurial investment wedge, τE


















, all t. (16)
The worker labor wedge, τW










As we will show below, it turns out that the investment wedge, τXt, and labor wedge, τLt, do
not necessarily equal the entrepreneurial investment wedge, τE




We ﬁnd it instructive to ﬁrst present our model and main result for the special case of log
utility, σ = 1.
1.5.1 Individual Behavior
The problem of an entrepreneur can be written recursively as:
Vt(k,d,z-1,z) = max











Here we denote by z-1 the productivity of an entrepreneur in the current period, by z
his productivity in the next period, and by z′ his productivity two periods ahead. The
expectation is taken over z′ only, because – as we discussed above – we assume that an
entrepreneur knows z at the time he chooses capital and debt holdings. This problem can
be simpliﬁed. To this end deﬁne an entrepreneur’s “cash-on-hand”, mit, and “net worth”,
ait, as
mit ≡ zitπtkit + (1 − δ)kit − (1 + rt)dit, ait ≡ kit − dit (18)
Lemma 1 Using the deﬁnitions in (18), the following dynamic program is equivalent to
(17):
vt(m,z) = max
a′ log(m − a






′ + (1 − δ)k
′ − (1 + rt+1)d
′, s.t.
15It is easy to see that τXt  = τE
Xt if the marginal rate of substitution of the “representative worker”,
u′(CW
t )/[βu′(CW
t+1)], is diﬀerent from that of the “representative entrepreneur”, u′(CE
t )/[βu′(CE
t+1)]. This










The interpretation of this result is that the problem of an entrepreneur can be solved as
a two-stage budgeting problem. In the ﬁrst stage, the entrepreneur chooses how much net
worth, a′, to carry over to the next period. In the second stage, conditional on a′, he
then solves an optimal portfolio allocation problem where he decides how to split his net
worth between capital, k′ and bonds, −d′. The borrowing constraint (6) immediately implies
that the amount of capital he holds can be at most a multiple λt ≡ (1 − θt)−1 of this net
worth. λt is therefore the maximum attainable leverage. From now on, a credit crunch will
interchangeably mean a drop in θt or λt.
Lemma 2 Capital and debt holdings are linear in net worth, and there is a productivity
cutoﬀ for being active zt+1.
kit+1 =
 
λtait+1, zit+1 ≥ zt+1
0, zit+1 < zt+1
, dit+1 =
 
(λt − 1)ait+1, zit+1 ≥ zt+1
−ait+1, zit+1 < zt+1.
(19)
The productivity cutoﬀ is deﬁned by zt+1πt+1 = rt+1 + δ.
Both the linearity and cutoﬀ properties follow directly from the fact that individual tech-
nologies (2) display constant returns to scale in capital and labor. We have already shown
that maximizing out over labor in (7), proﬁts are linear in capital, (8). It follows that the
optimal capital choice is at a corner: it is zero for entrepreneurs with low productivity, and
the maximal amount allowed by the collateral constraints, λta′, for those with high produc-
tivity. The productivity of the marginal entrepreneur is zt+1. For him, the return on one
unit of capital zπt+1 equals the user cost of capital, rt+1 + δ. The linearity of capital and
debt delivers much of the tractability of our model.
Lemma 3 Entrepreneurs save a constant fraction of cash-on-hand:
ait+1 = βmit+1, (20)
or using the deﬁnitions of cash-on-hand and net worth in (18)
kit+1 − dit+1 = β[zitπtkit + (1 − δ)kit − (1 + rt)dit]. (21)
1.5.2 Aggregation
Aggregating (21) over all entrepreneurs, we obtain our ﬁrst main result:





Kt+1 = β [αYt + (1 − δ)Kt] (23)
where
Zt =




= E[z|z ≥ zt]
α (24)
is measured TFP. The cutoﬀ is deﬁned by
λt−1(1 − Ψ(zt)) = 1. (25)
Corollary 1 Aggregate entrepreneurial consumption is given by CE
t = (1−β)[αYt+(1−δ)Kt]










+ 1 − δ
 
(26)
Aggregate consumption of workers is given by CW
t = (1 − α)Yt.
1.5.3 A Credit Crunch
In this section, we conduct the following thought experiment: consider an economy that is
in steady state at time, t = 0, with a given degree of ﬁnancial friction, λ0 (equivalently,
θ0 = 1 − 1/λ0). At time t = 1, there is a credit crunch: λt falls and then recovers over time
according to
λt+1 = (1 − ρ)λ0 + ρλt, ρ ∈ (0,1) (27)
until it reaches the pre-crunch level of λ0. We ask: what are the “impulse responses” of
aggregate output, consumption and capital accumulation to this credit crunch?
Proposition 2 In our benchmark economy and under the assumption of log-utility, a credit
crunch
(i) is isomorphic to a drop in total factor productivity as can be seen from (24) and (25).
(ii) does not not distort the Euler equation of a “representative entrepreneur” which is
given by (26), and hence the entrepreneurial investment wedge deﬁned in (16) is zero,
τE
Xt = 0 for all t.
(iii) results in an investment wedge, τXt, deﬁned recursively by
Ct+1
Ct















, t ≥ 1 τX0 = 0. (28)
12(iv) results in a worker labor wedge τW
Lt = 0, and a labor wedge given by τLt = −CE
t /CW
t .
A credit crunch distorts the investment decisions of individual entrepreneurs. One may have
expected that therefore also the investment decision of a “representative entrepreneur” is
distorted. Part (ii) of the proposition states that this is not the case: a credit crunch lowers
aggregate investment only to the extent that it lowers TFP and therefore the aggregate
marginal product of capital; the wedge in the Euler equation of a representative entrepreneur
is identically zero. This result is not straightforward. Much of the next subsection – which
also covers the more general case of CRRA utility – will be concerned with discussing the
intuition behind it. Part (iii) of the Proposition states that while aggregate investment is
not distorted, there is nevertheless a non-zero investment wedge as in Deﬁnition 1. This
is because, while the Euler equation of the “representative entrepreneur” is not distorted,
the “representative worker” is borrowing constrained and has consumption CW
t = (1−α)Yt.
Aggregate consumption is the sum of the consumption of workers and entrepreneurs. The
aggregate investment wedge is found by matching up two equations: the growth rate of
aggregate consumption and the equation deﬁning the aggregate investment (15). It can
easily be seen that a non-zero investment wedge is needed to match up these two equations.
Its size depends on relative consumption growth of entrepreneurs and workers. We will argue
momentarily that this investment wedge is actually “upside down”, in the sense of looking
like a subsidy to investment as opposed to a tax. Furthermore, this investment wedge is really
an artifact of one of the modeling assumptions we make to obtain closed forms, namely that
workers cannot save. We show that under the alternative assumption that workers can save
in a risk-less asset and face idiosyncratic labor income risk, the investment wedge becomes
negligible. Finally, part (iv) shows that there is also a labor wedge. This is the case even
though workers are on their labor supply curve (the worker labor wedge is zero), and – as
was the case for the investment wedge – results from our assumption that entrepreneurs and
workers are two distinct classes of agents.
Figures 1 and 2 graphically illustrate Proposition 2. Figure 1 displays the time-paths for
the degree of ﬁnancial frictions λt and the implied TFP path.16 Since the two are isomor-
phic, we choose the initial drop in λt so as to cause a ten percent decline in productivity.
Figure 2 shows the eﬀect of a credit crunch on aggregate TFP (panel a), the entrepreneurial
investment wedge (panel b), the investment wedge (panel c), and the labor wedge (panel
d). Panel (a) simply restates the productivity drop from Figure 1. Panel (b) shows the
entrepreneurial investment wedge, τE
Xt, which is zero throughout the transition as discussed
in the Proposition. Panel (c) shows the investment wedge, τXt. It is positive at ﬁrst, and
16We use the following parametrization of the model: β = 0.95, δ = 0.06, α = 0.33, λ0 = 3, and assume
that the distribution of productivity of entrepreneurs is Pareto, ηz−η−1, with tail parameter η = 2.1739.














Fig. 1: Response to a Credit Crunch













(b) Entrepreneurial Investment Wedge














Fig. 2: Response to a Credit Crunch
14negative throughout most of the transition; in steady state, it is zero because consumption
growth for both workers and entrepreneurs is zero (see equation (28)). Importantly, and
contrary to what the reader may have expected, the investment wedge is negative, meaning
it looks like a subsidy. Finally, panel (d) shows the labor wedge deﬁned in (14) which also
looks like a subsidy.17 That both the investment and the labor wedge do not equal zero is
mainly due to our modeling assumptions, an issue we discuss now.
In order to obtain closed form solutions, we have separated individuals into “en-
trepreneurs” and “workers” and have assumed that the latter cannot save. Since workers
are by assumption not “on their Euler equation”, it is this assumption that delivers a zero
entrepreneurial investment wedge, but a non-zero investment wedge. The left panel of
Figure 3 presents the investment wedge under two alternative assumptions on the savings
behavior of workers: they save in a risk-free bond; and they save in a risk-free bond and
additionally face some labor income risk as in Aiyagari (1994). In both cases we assume
that they need to hold non-negative wealth, i.e. they cannot borrow. Details are in
Appendix B. When workers save in a risk-free bond but face no labor income risk (green,
























Fig. 3: Alternative Assumptions about Workers’ Savings: Investment and Labor Wedges
dash-dotted line), the investment wedge is negative throughout the entire transition. That
the investment wedge is not zero comes from the fact that while workers can save, they are
still borrowing constrained. This is because the interest rate in our economy is less than
the rate of time preference and therefore, in the absence of risk, workers hold zero wealth
in the initial steady state. A negative TFP shock triggered by a credit crunch decreases
the wage and only worsens this borrowing constraint. This implies that their consumption
growth rate is higher than that of entrepreneurs and hence from (28) that the investment
wedge is negative. In contrast, with labor income risk (red, solid line), workers in the initial
17In contrast, the worker labor wedge, which we choose not to display here is identically zero throughout
the transition.
15steady state hold positive wealth due to precautionary motifs. This means that only a small
fraction of them end up borrowing-constrained when their wage falls after a credit crunch.
Most workers are therefore on their unconstrained Euler equations and the investment
wedge becomes negligible.
Panel (b) of Figure 3 presents the labor wedge under two alternative assumptions on
savings behavior. As discussed in Proposition 2, the labor wedge is a function of the con-
sumption of entrepreneurs relative to that of workers. In the two extensions where workers
accumulate assets, the diﬀerence in the growth rate of the consumption of workers and
entrepreneurs is smaller, and therefore, the movements in the labor wedge is smoother.18
1.6 General CRRA Utility and Intuition for Undistorted Aggre-
gate Euler Equation
This section presents the case where individuals’ preferences are given by the general CRRA
utility function (1). It also presents an alternative and more intuitive derivation of the result
in Proposition 2 that a credit crunch does not distort the Euler equation of a representative
entrepreneur, τE
Xt = 0. We show that the result follows from a general equilibrium eﬀect that
comes from bonds being in zero net supply. The analysis of the saving problem of individual
entrepreneurs with CRRA utility is similar to the log case analyzed in the preceding section.19
We therefore relegate the details to Appendix C.
1.6.1 Individual Euler Equations









it+1 ≡ 1 + rt+1 + λt max{R
k
it+1 − 1 − rt+1,0} =
Rk
it+1kit+1 − (1 + rt+1)dit+1
ait+1
(30)
18Ultimately, the labor wedge in our benchmark model stems from the fact that entrepreneurs do not
supply labor. We conjecture that a relatively straightforward extension of our model where entrepreneurs
supply labor will feature a negligible labor wedge.
19For σ  = 1, the saving policy function cannot be solved in closed form anymore. While the saving policy
function can still be shown to be linear in cash-on-hand, the saving rate now depends on future productivity,
zit+1 (which is known at time t): ait+1 = st+1(zit+1)ait. With log-utility st+1(zit+1) = β is constant because
the income and substitution eﬀects of a higher productivity draw exactly oﬀset each other.
20The Euler equation (29) is u′(cit) = βE[u′(cit+1)Ra
it+1]. The return to wealth Ra
it+1 can be taken out
of the expectation because of our assumption that next period’s productivity zit+1 and therefore Ra
it+1 is
known at the time ait+1 is chosen. Further, the second equality in (30) uses the complementary slackness
condition (Rk
it+1 − 1 − rt+1)(λtai+1 − kit+1) = 0.






+ 1 − δ (31)
is the return to capital. Note that for credit constrained entrepreneurs, the return to capital
is greater than the interest rate, Rk
it+1 > 1 + rt+1. Therefore also their return to savings
is higher than the interest rate, Ra
it+1 > 1 + rt+1, which is to say that individual Euler
equations are distorted.21 In contrast and as we have shown in Proposition 2, aggregate
investment is undistorted under certain conditions. The goal of this section is to show how
distorted individual Euler equations can be aggregated to obtain an undistorted aggregate
Euler equation of the form (26). This alternative derivation of (26) has the advantage that
directly working with individual Euler equations is more intuitive and also underlines that
the logic behind our result is, in fact, quite general.
1.6.2 Euler Equation of Representative Entrepreneur































Right-Hand Side. By manipulating the right-hand side, (34), we obtain the following
Lemma whose proof is simple and therefore stated in the main text.
Lemma 4 (RHS) A wealth weighted average of the return to wealth accumulation across




+ 1 − δ.















21However, note that the distortion at the individual level takes the form of a subsidy rather than a tax,
that is investment wedges at the individual level are negative. This is because for a constrained entrepreneur,
each dollar saved has an additional shadow value because it relaxes his borrowing constraint.
17where the second equality uses that bonds are in zero net supply, (10). Using the deﬁnition
of Rk


















+ 1 − δ.￿
Lemma 4 will be the main building block of the result that the Euler equation of a repre-
sentative entrepreneur is not distorted (Proposition 3). The proof of the Lemma has two
main steps: the ﬁrst step is to show that the aggregate return to wealth equals the aggregate
return to capital. Entrepreneurs can allocate their wealth between two assets, capital and
bonds. But in the aggregate, bonds are in zero net supply. Therefore the aggregate return
to wealth must equal the aggregate return to capital. This result is remarkably general. It
does not in any way depend on the form of utility or production functions. For example, the
latter could display decreasing returns to scale. We spend some more time discussing this
result in the next paragraph. The second step in the proof is to show that a capital weighted










+ 1 − δ.
The assumption of Cobb-Douglas production functions is crucial for this step because it
implies that the marginal product of capital is proportional to the average product. Given
the Cobb-Douglas assumption, this second step is relatively mechanical and we will not
discuss it further.
The key to understanding Lemma 4 is a general equilibrium eﬀect that comes from
bonds being in zero net supply. To gain some intuition, consider an economy that starts in
equilibrium with (λt,rt+1) = (λ,r). At time t, a credit crunch hits and leverage decreases to
λ∗ < λ. We index variables by (λ,r) and trace out the economy’s response. We suppress time
subscripts for notational simplicity. When r is ﬁxed in partial equilibrium, an immediate
eﬀect of the credit crunch is that credit is restricted and hence aggregate capital demand







aidi ≡ A (35)
Following similar steps as in Lemma 4, the wealth weighted average of individual returns to




















+ 1 − δ
(36)
18In partial equilibrium, a credit crunch causes the aggregate return to wealth to fall below
the aggregate return to capital. This is because the credit crunch results in a positive share
of the aggregate portfolio being allocated towards bonds which earn a lower return than
capital. The implication is that a credit crunch looks like the introduction of a tax on the
returns to capital, with the second line of (36) corresponding to the pre-tax return and the
ﬁrst line to the after-tax return. Put another way: in partial equilibrium, the entrepreneurial
investment wedge is positive. In general equilibrium, however, things look quite diﬀerent.
An immediate implication of (35) is that the interest rate must fall until bonds are in zero






+ 1 − δ
Bonds being in zero net supply means that the share of the aggregate portfolio invested in
bonds equals zero as before the credit crunch. Therefore the aggregate return to wealth
again equals the aggregate return to capital, and the eﬀect of the credit crunch is entirely
absorbed by a decrease in TFP.
This general equilibrium eﬀect obviously hinges on our economy being closed. In an
open economy a credit crunch would lead to an increase in the entrepreneurial investment
wedge. We ﬁnd it worthwhile to note that the sign of the level of the investment wedge is
generally ambiguous. In particular it will often be negative, meaning it looks like a subsidy to
investment.22 Another crucial assumption is that the borrowing constraint takes the form (6).
Consider instead a more general borrowing constraint kit+1 ≤ bit+1(ait+1,zit+1,rt+1,wt+1,...).
One can show that Lemma 4 holds if and only if the elasticity of the borrowing limit, bit+1,
with respect to wealth, ait+1, is one. Apart from that, the borrowing constraint can be a
general function of, say, individual productivities, prices and so on.
Left-Hand Side. By manipulating the left-hand side (33), we obtain the following Lemma.




















and therefore the entrepreneurial investment wedge as deﬁned in (16) is negative whenever the economy’s
aggregate capital stock, Kt+1, is greater than its aggregate wealth At+1. Depending on the degree of
heterogeneity, a negative investment wedge may, in fact, be the only possibility. To see this consider
the degenerate case with homogenous entrepreneurs who all face the same collateral constraints Kt+1 ≤
λtAt+1,λt ≥ 1. Since everyone is alike, the constraint can only bind if the economy as a whole is borrowing,
Kt+1 > At+1. The investment wedge must therefore be negative in this degenerate case. The intuition is
straightforward: for a constrained entrepreneur, each dollar saved has an additional shadow value because









1 − ¯ st+1
1 − ¯ st+2




and st+1(z) is the saving rate of type z.
For the special case of log-utility, σ = 1, all entrepreneurs save the same fraction of their







Combining Left-Hand Side and Right-Hand Side. In the case of log-utility, (38) and
Lemma 4 together immediately imply the undistorted aggregate Euler equation in (26).23 In
the more general case of CRRA utility, we can still combine Lemmas 4 and 5 to obtain
Proposition 3 In our benchmark economy with general CRRA utility, a credit crunch





















1 − ¯ st+1
1 − ¯ st+2
(39)
where the initial (steady state) value is τE
X0 = (β/¯ s − 1)/(1 − β(1 − δ)).


































where the initial (steady state) investment wedge is τX0 = τE
X0.
Consistent with Proposition 2, the entrepreneurial investment wedge in (i) collapses to τE
Xt =
0 for the case of log-utility σ = 1. This is because in that case ¯ st = β. For σ  = 1 the
entrepreneurial investment wedge can be either positive or negative. We illustrate this in
Figure 4 which shows the eﬀect of a credit crunch for three diﬀerent values of the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ. A value of σ = 1 corresponds to log-
utility and therefore the transition dynamics for that case are identical to Figure 2. The
23Similarly, the law of motion of the aggregate capital stock in the economy with CRRA utility is




For the special case σ = 1, and hence st(z) = β, we obtain (23).


















(b) Entrepreneurial Investment Wedge














Fig. 4: Response to a Credit Crunch: General CRRA Utility
entrepreneurial investment wedge (panel b) is positive for the case where σ < 1 and negative
for the case σ > 1. This is intuitive: if entrepreneurs are relatively unwilling to substitute
intertemporally (σ is high), they overaccumulate assets. In aggregate data, this looks like
a subsidy to savings. The wedges further depend on σ in a continuous fashion: for values
of σ that are “close” to one such as the ones chosen in the Figure, the wedges are “similar”
to the log-case. Finally, the non-zero entrepreneurial investment wedge for the case σ  = 1
is best thought of as arising from individual marginal utilities not being equalized under
incomplete markets, rather than from the presence of borrowing constraints. The parameter
governing borrowing constraints, λt, only enters the aggregate Euler equation (32) through
the right-hand side (34). But this equals the aggregate marginal product of capital regardless
of σ (Lemma 4). In contrast, the left-hand-side (33) encodes individual marginal utilities
and hence aggregation eﬀects due to incomplete insurance and so on.
2 Heterogeneous Investment Costs
We have argued in the previous two sections that in an economy with heterogeneity in
productivity, a credit crunch shows up in TFP; in contrast, the investment wedge is either
zero or small. The purpose of the next two sections is to argue that this is by no means
21necessarily the case. If heterogeneity takes a diﬀerent form, a credit crunch can show up as
either an investment or a labor wedge. In this section, we consider the case of heterogeneous
investment costs and show that a credit crunch manifests itself as an investment wedge while
aggregate TFP is unaﬀected by construction.24
The economy is essentially the same as in section 1 but diﬀers in one important aspect:
we replace heterogeneity in the productivity of ﬁnal goods producers with heterogeneity
in investment costs. To obtain one unit of investment goods, diﬀerent entrepreneurs have
to give up diﬀerent amounts of consumption goods. The role of credit markets is then to
reallocate funds towards those entrepreneurs with low investment costs.
Besides allowing us to make the point that diﬀerent forms of heterogeneity have diﬀer-
ent aggregate implications, the case of heterogeneous adjustment is also useful to relate to
much of the existing literature on ﬁnancial frictions and business cycles. In particular, a
number of papers make the assumption that each period “investment opportunities” arrive
randomly to some exogenous fraction of entrepreneurs. Only entrepreneurs with an “invest-
ment opportunity” can acquire new investment goods; others cannot.25 In our framework,
this corresponds to an extreme form of heterogeneous investment costs: either investment
costs are zero, corresponding to the arrival of an investment opportunity, or inﬁnite.
2.1 Preferences, Technology and Budgets
There is a representative ﬁnal goods producer with technology Yt = AKα
t L1−α. Hence there
is no heterogeneity in ﬁnal goods production.26 Since TFP is exogenous, an immediate
implication is that a credit crunch cannot result in an eﬃciency wedge by assumption.
Final goods producers rent capital from entrepreneurs at a rental rate Rt. In equilibrium,
24As pointed out by Kurlat (2010) who analyzes a similar model with heterogeneity in the eﬃciency of
investment, a credit crunch in models like his and ours may manifest itself as an eﬃciency wedge in addition
to an investment wedge if capital formation is measured inaccurately. If capital formation measures fail to
take into account decreases in the eﬃciency of investment due to a worse allocation of resources, a credit
crunch in one period would show up as decreased aggregate TFP in future periods. Related, a decline in
current TFP would arise if GDP were measured using the relative prices of consumption and investment
for some base year, as is commonly done in practice. We here instead operate under the assumption that
capital is measured correctly and that GDP is measured in units of consumption at current prices.
25The following papers all feature such heterogeneous “investment opportunities”: Bernanke and Gertler
(1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998),
Kiyotaki and Moore (2005), Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), and Kurlat (2010).
Exceptions with heterogeneous productivity are Kiyotaki (1998), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011), and
Khan and Thomas (2010).
26An alternative assumption that also implies that ﬁnal goods production can be summarized by an
aggregate production function is that there is heterogeneity in productivity but ﬁnal goods producers do not
face any credit (or other) constraints. The fact that homogeneity of ﬁnal goods producers is equivalent to
perfect credit markets for ﬁnal goods producers underlines again that the important feature of a model is
how credit constraints interact with heterogeneity.
22Rt = αYt/Kt.
There is still a continuum of entrepreneurs indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. These entrepreneurs
have the same preferences as before, (1), but to make our point in the simplest way, we
restrict the analysis to the case of log-utility σ = 1. They own and accumulate capital, and
rent it to the representative ﬁrm. Entrepreneurs diﬀer in their investment costs which we
denote by ωit. To increase the capital stock by xit units of capital, an entrepreneur has to
give up ωitxit units of the ﬁnal good where ωit ≥ 1. Each period, entrepreneurs draw a
new investment cost from a distribution ψ(ω). The budget constraint of an entrepreneur is
therefore
cit + ωitxit = Rtkit − (1 + rt)dit + dit+1
The law of motion for capital and the borrowing constraint are unchanged and given by (3)
and (6). As before, entrepreneurs simply maximize their utility subject to these constraints.
We also continue to assume that workers don’t save and simply consume their labor income.
2.2 Aggregation and Credit Crunch
To answer the question whether there will be an investment wedge in this economy, we can
aggregate individual Euler equations in a similar fashion to section 1.6.
Proposition 4 In the economy with heterogeneous adjustment costs, the Euler equation of












































In contrast to the case with heterogeneous productivity, heterogeneous investment costs
imply that the Euler equation of a representative entrepreneur (41) appears distorted. With
imperfect credit markets, some entrepreneurs with investment costs, ωit > 1 will be active











Comparing this aggregate Euler equation to the equation deﬁning the entrepreneurial invest-
ment wedge, (15), it is obvious that τE
Xt  = 0. The second part of the proposition makes this
23intuition precise. It is in fact tempting to set the entrepreneurial investment wedge equal
to 1 + τE
Xt =
 
ωit(kit/Kt)di. However, this would be incorrect because the weights on ωit
are given by kit+1/Kt+1 rather than kit/Kt. Hence the more complicated deﬁnition of τE
Xt in
(42) is needed.
Summarizing, in a model with heterogeneous investment costs the results from the model
with heterogeneous productivities are reversed: a credit crunch results in an entrepreneurial
investment wedge and – by construction – in no eﬃciency wedge. This is illustrated in Figure
5 (but see the discussion in footnote 24 on capital measurement issues and their implications
for wedges).27













(b) Entrepreneurial Investment Wedge














Fig. 5: Response to a Credit Crunch: Heterogenous Investment Costs
3 Heterogenous Recruitment Costs
We have shown that two diﬀerent assumptions on the dimension along which individual
entrepreneurs are heterogeneous can lead to a credit crunch resulting in either an eﬃciency
or an investment wedge. In this section, we show that with heterogeneity in yet another
27We assume that the investment cost is uniformly distribution over [1,1.1]. We consider the same shock
to the collateral constraint as in the benchmark model.
24dimension, namely labor recruitment costs, a credit crunch can also show up as a labor
wedge.
Our starting point is the observation that with some form of labor search frictions, labor
looks very much like capital. In particular, search models typically have the feature that,
in order to increase their labor force, ﬁrms have to post vacancies one period in advance,
exactly in the same way they invest to increase their stock of physical capital.28 This implies
that ﬁnancial frictions have the potential to aﬀect employment and hence the labor wedge.29
We show in this section that an extension of our previous model that features labor search
frictions, in combination with heterogeneity across entrepreneurs in the cost of recruiting,
can indeed deliver a labor wedge. The result follows exactly the same logic as our previous
results on the investment and eﬃciency wedges. A credit crunch aﬀects the allocation of
labor across entrepreneurs with diﬀerent recruitment costs in such a way that the aggregate
cost of recruiting increases which delivers a drop in employment and hence an increase in
the labor wedge. If instead, our model were to feature heterogeneity in productivity, a credit
crunch would show up as a TFP wedge (see Appendix E where we work out such a model).
Heterogeneous recruitment costs are not merely a theoretical construct that we use to
make our point. For instance, Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2010) examine US data
and ﬁnd substantial heterogeneity in the cross-section of the “vacancy yield” of ﬁrms (the
number of realized hires per reported job opening).
3.1 Preferences, Technology and Budgets
There is again a continuum of entrepreneurs indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. They have the preferences
in (1). Each entrepreneur employs lit workers and produces yit = Alit units of output.
Note that, in contrast to the previous sections, there is no capital for simplicity. With search
frictions, labor becomes a state variable so dropping capital from the model allows us to work
with only one state variable and retain closed form solutions. Furthermore productivity, A,
is homogenous across ﬁrms. Therefore there is no eﬃciency wedge by assumption. An
entrepreneur’s employment evolves according to
lit+1 = xit + (1 − δ)lit, (43)
where xit is the number of new hires and δ is the exogenous rate of job separations. In order
to hire a worker, an entrepreneur has has to post a costly vacancy. We assume that in order
to attract xit workers, an entrepreneur has to post ωitxit vacancies. We refer to 1/ωit as
28For a formulation where this is very apparent see Shimer (2010).
29For other frameworks in which ﬁnancial frictions result in a labor wedge, see Jermann and Quadrini
(2009), Arellano, Bai and Kehoe (2011).
25the “vacancy yield”. ωit is drawn from ψ(ω), and is assumed to be iid across entrepreneurs
and over time. Posting one vacancy costs one unit of the consumption good and hence the
budget constraint of an entrepreneur is
cit + ωitxit − dit+1 = Alit − wtlit − (1 + rt)dit (44)
Note that we assume that all entrepreneurs pay a common wage, wt. Given that search
frictions introduce the possibility of diﬀerent wage determination mechanisms and that these
search frictions are heterogeneous across ﬁrms, this is not necessarily the case. However, we
show below that such a common wage is consistent with individual rationality. We therefore
proceed using the assumption of a common wage.
We change our borrowing constraint slightly. We assume that an entrepreneur can issue
debt worth at most a fraction θt of output in the next period:30
dit+1 ≤ θtAlit+1. (45)
The reason for working with this slightly diﬀerent constraint is that our previous constraint
(6) has capital on the right-hand side. The result that a credit crunch shows up as a labor
wedge if recruitment costs are heterogeneous would remain unchanged, if we reintroduced
capital into the model and worked with the constraint (6). However, we could no longer
obtain closed form solutions in this case. That being said, entrepreneurs maximize their
utility, (1), subject to (43), (44) and (45).












where γ > 0 measures the disutility of working, and ε > 0 is the Frisch (constant marginal
utility of wealth) elasticity of labor supply. We continue to assume that workers cannot
save and simply consume their labor income, CW
t = wtLt. With the preferences in (46), the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption is given by v′(L)/u′(C) =
γL1/εC. Using that in our economy without capital, α = 0 and Yt = ALt, the labor wedge
– as deﬁned in (14) – reduces to
τLt = 1 − γL
1/ε
t Ct/A. (47)
30This can again be motivated with a limited commitment problem: entrepreneurs can default on their
loans. In this case, a creditor can obtain a fraction θt of output yit+1. Knowing this, the creditor restricts
his loan to be less than θtyit+1.
263.2 Wages
In models with search frictions, wages are typically determined through Nash-bargaining be-
tween employers and employees. We work out the Nash bargaining solution in Appendix D
and show that the fact that entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their recruitment costs, ωit,
results in entrepreneur-speciﬁc wages being paid. This makes the Nash solution somewhat
complicated to work with, in particular given that our stated goal is to derive simple char-
acterizations of aggregate variables. We therefore pursue a diﬀerent approach in the main
text, exploiting the well-known fact that search models typically feature a set of wages that
workers are willing to accept and that employers are willing to pay (Hall, 2005). Any such
wage satisﬁes the condition that no worker-employer pair has an unexploited opportunity
for mutual improvement. This is useful because there is, in particular, a common wage that
is in this bargaining set.





t ≤ wt ≤ A.




t , but smaller than the marginal product of labor, A, is in the bargaining set.31 We
then simply impose an ad-hoc wage rule, namely that the wage always lies exactly halfway







Since workers are hand-to-mouth workers, CW
t = wtLt, we immediately get that the common




We obtain the following characterization of an entrepreneur’s optimal choice of recruiters
and hence workers next period.
Lemma 7 The optimal labor choice of an entrepreneur satisﬁes
ωitlit+1 − dit+1 = β [Alit (1 + (1 − δ)ωit) − wtlit − (1 + r)dit] (48)
Note that this expression is of the same form as the optimal savings policy function in
the case with debt-constrained capital accumulation, (21). The term in brackets on the
31The same condition is made use of in Blanchard and Gali (2010).
27right-hand-side of (48) is an entrepreneur’s “cash-on-hand”. The assumption of log-utility
then implies that he then “saves” a constant fraction β of this “cash-on-hand”. Here, one of
the entrepreneur’s assets is his stock of workers, valued by their opportunity cost in terms
of ﬁnal goods, ωitlit+1.
3.4 Aggregation and Credit Crunch
We want to show that in the present model with heterogeneous recruitment costs, a credit
crunch results in a labor wedge. To do so, we aggregate (48) over all entrepreneurs and
obtain the following characterization of the evolution of employment and hence the labor
wedge.

















where Ωt ≡ ωitlit+1/Lt+1di is the “aggregate recruitment cost”. A credit crunch increases Ωt
and hence decreases employment, Lt+1, resulting in an increase of the labor wedge, τLt+1,
deﬁned in (47).
Figure 6 graphically illustrates the response to a credit crunch in the economy with hetero-
geneous recruitment costs.
4 Other Implications of a Credit Crunch
Up to this point we have focused on the implications of a credit crunch for standard aggregate
variables, seen through the lens of a representative agent model. We have shown that the
same fundamental shock has very diﬀerent aggregate implications, depending on the nature
of the underlying heterogeneity. These results raise the natural question: Does the use of
more disaggregated data help to disentangle the source of aggregate ﬂuctuations?
We now discuss how a credit crunch materializes in terms of various relatively more
disaggregate variables: measures of external ﬁnance, the diﬀerential between the aggregate
marginal product of capital and the interest rate, and the distribution of productivity of
active entrepreneurs.
4.1 External Finance Measures
A variable that naturally contains information about the extent to which credit conditions
have contracted is the use of external funds to ﬁnance investment or recruitment costs.













(b) Entrepreneurial Investment Wedge














Fig. 6: Response to a Credit Crunch: Heterogenous Recruitment Costs
For instance, the ratio of (gross) aggregate debts Dt relative to the aggregate capital stock
directly identiﬁes the collateral constraint parameter θt−1 in our ﬁrst two models:32 Dt/Kt =
θt−1, which uses the fact that entrepreneurs are either inactive so employ zero capital and
lend, or are active in which case they use capital and exhaust their borrowing limit (6). If
there are no capital markets, θt = 0, there is no external ﬁnance: Dt/Kt = 0. If capital
markets are perfect, θt = 1, the entire capital stock of the economy is ﬁnanced externally:
Dt/Kt = 1. A related measure, which can be calculated more easily as it does not require
information on the aggregate capital stock, is the ratio of (gross) aggregate debt relative
to GDP. In our ﬁrst two models, this ratio equals the product of the collateral constraint
parameter and the capital to output ratio: Dt/Yt = θt−1Kt/Yt.
In panel (a) of Figure 7 we show how this measure behaves in response to a credit crunch
for the three models we consider. In all three cases we see that a credit crunch is associated
with a decline in the ratio of external ﬁnance to GDP. In the models with heterogeneous
investment or recruitment cost the ratio of external ﬁnance to GDP trivially contracts, at
least on impact, as the capital to output ratio is constant. In the model with heterogeneous
productivities the overall eﬀect is ambiguous as it depends on the value of the elasticity of
32In the model with heterogeneous recruitment costs, the collateral constraint parameter equals the ratio
of (gross) aggregate debt to GDP, Dt/Yt = θt−1.

































Fig. 7: Response of External-Finance-to-GDP to a Credit Crunch
TFP, Zt, with respect to θt−1, but we can show that the ratio of external ﬁnance to GDP
unambiguously declines in a credit crunch provided θt−1 is small.
Panel (a) of Figure 7 also shows the behavior of external ﬁnance to GDP ratio in the
benchmark model in response to a negative, pure TFP shock (of the same magnitude as the
decline in TFP cause by the credit crunch). In contrast to a credit crunch, a negative TFP
shock results in an increase in the external ﬁnance to GDP ratio. This is because θt−1 is
constant, and therefore, the behavior of the ratio of external ﬁnance to GDP is the mirror
image of the capital to output ratio, which increases in response to a negative TFP shock.
In panel (b) of Figure 7 we present related measures for the US economy during the
credit contraction of 2008, which for the business sector followed the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers. In particular, we plot the ratio of credit market liabilities to the value-added for
the non-farm, non-ﬁnancial non-corporate (dashed line) and corporate (solid line) sectors.
We present deviations of the series from a Hodrick-Prescott trend.33 Since the collapse of
Lehman the credit to GDP of the non-corporate sector declined by more than ten percent.
For the corporate sector there was a slightly smaller decline, which started with a lag of two
quarters.34 To put these numbers into perspective, note that in the US National Income and
Product Accounts, about 25-30% of business GDP is generated by the non-corporate sector.
The behavior of external ﬁnance to GDP in the data is therefore broadly consistent with its
behavior in our model following a credit crunch. Moreover, the response of this statistic to
a credit crunch is consistent across model variants, and at the same time diﬀerent from the
one to a pure TFP shock.
33We use a value for the smoothing parameters of 1600, commonly used for quarterly data.
34Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2011) document a fact that may be related to this asymmetric behavior
of external ﬁnance for the corporate and non-corporate sectors: for publicly traded ﬁrms (in Compustat),
almost all investment is ﬁnanced internally while most investment by privately held ﬁrms (from the Amadeus
database) is ﬁnanced through borrowing. This fact is related because all publicly traded ﬁrms are corpora-
tions and most privately held ﬁrms are not.
304.2 Return Premium
The diﬀerential between the aggregate marginal product of capital and the interest rate
(return premium) is another variable that could in principle provide useful information to
identify a credit crunch.
In panel (a) of Figure 8 we show the behavior of the return premium in a credit crunch in
the benchmark model (solid line) and the model with heterogeneous investment cost (dashed
line). In the benchmark model, a credit crunch results in a sharp decline of the interest rate






























Fig. 8: Response of Return Premium to a Credit Crunch
that is greater than the fall in the future marginal product of capital. This leads to an
increase in the return premium (solid line). The initial eﬀect is eventually reversed, and
the return premium turns negative. A smoother and monotonic version of this response
is obtained in the version of the benchmark model where workers face labor income risk
(dashed line, see Appendix B for details of the model). In the model with heterogeneous
investment cost the return premium mimics the behavior of the investment wedge, which
translates into an increase, and gradual decline, in the return premium. In the benchmark
model with Pareto distributed shocks, the behavior of the return premium in response to a
TFP shock is identical to the behavior of the return premium in response to a credit crunch.
Thus, the return premium is not necessarily a very useful statistic to separate a pure TFP
shock from a shock to collateral constraints.
In panel (b) of Figure 8 we show the evolution of the return premium for the US economy
during the credit contraction of 2008.35 Consistent with the broad implications of the model
shown in the left panel, the diﬀerential between the aggregate marginal product of capital
and the interest rate widened in the period that followed the fourth quarter of 2008.
35To measure the aggregate marginal product of capital we use α = 0.33, real GDP data and capital stock
constructed using the permanent inventory method, real investment data, and δ = 0.06. We initialized the
capital stock by K1946.75 = I1947/(0.06+ 0.032). For the real interest rate we use the 3-month Treasury bill
secondary market annual rate minus the quarterly inﬂation rate of the GDP deﬂator.
314.3 Productivity and Firm Size Distribution and Reallocation
Given that we emphasize the importance of heterogeneity, it is natural to attempt to identify
a credit crunch from the evolution over the business cycle of certain distributions of variables
at the micro level. Consider our ﬁrst model where entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in
their productivity. As shown in Proposition 1, a credit crunch results in a decrease of the
productivity threshold for being active. That is, there is entry of unproductive ﬁrms which
causes a drop in TFP. This is consistent with evidence in Kehrig (2011) who documents that
the dispersion of productivity in U.S. durable manufacturing is greater in recessions than
in booms, which primarily reﬂects a relatively higher share of unproductive ﬁrms. This is
in contrast to the so-called “cleansing eﬀect” of recessions (Caballero and Hammour, 1994).
That a productivity threshold for being active decreases is also a feature of our two other
model variants. However, we do not know of any evidence that have documented this for
the case of investment or recruitment costs.
Our model also predicts that a credit crunch results in a decrease of the share of employ-
ment of the, say, top ten percent most productive ﬁrms. As less productive entrepreneurs
become active and use labor and capital, the share of factors employed by the most produc-
tive entrepreneurs declines. This implication is consistent with the evidence in Moscarini and
Postel-Vinay (2010), provided that we interpret large ﬁrms in the data as more productive.
Finally, in all our three model variants, a credit crunch has real eﬀects because it worsens
the allocation of resources across heterogeneous ﬁrms. Measures of the reallocation of re-
sources are therefore obvious statistics to examine as part of any attempt to identify a credit
crunch. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) ﬁnd that the amount of capital reallocation between
ﬁrms (sales of property, plant and equipment, and acquisitions) decreases in recessions. For
the Great Depression, Ziebarth (2011) documents that increases in the amount of resource
misallocation can explain a substantial fraction of the TFP decline in two particular indus-
tries (50% for manufactured ice and 10 to 15% for cement). In a similar spirit, Sandleris and
Wright (2011) argue that resource misallocation accounts for roughly half of the ten percent
decline in manufacturing TFP during the Argentine ﬁnancial crisis.
5 Conclusion
The main message of this paper is that while trying to learn about the sources of business
cycles using a representative agent framework and aggregate data alone may seem appealing,
this approach is invalidated by the presence of heterogeneity. This follows from our result
that the mapping from a credit crunch in a heterogeneous agent economy to the aggregate
variables in a representative agent economy depends crucially on the form of underlying het-
32erogeneity; depending on where an economy features heterogeneity, a credit crunch can show
up in very diﬀerent aggregate variables. To make this argument concrete, we have examined
the implications of a credit crunch for simple aggregate wedges. We have shown that a credit
crunch shows up as an eﬃciency wedge if there is heterogeneity in the productivity of ﬁnal
goods producers. In contrast, it shows up as an investment wedge if investment costs are
heterogeneous; or as a labor wedge if recruitment costs are heterogeneous.
In addition, we have argued that going beyond data on standard aggregates such as
output, labor, and investment and instead examining more disaggregated data may allow
for the identiﬁcation of a credit crunch. An obvious candidate is the use of information
on the amount of externally ﬁnanced capital relative to GDP, as a statistic that tells an
unambiguous story across models of ﬁnancial friction.
Appendices
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 The Lemma follows directly from using the deﬁnitions of cash-on-
hand, mt and net worth, at in the dynamic programming problem (17).
Proof of Lemma 2 The Lemma follows from the linearity of the portfolio allocation
problem, i.e. the maximization problem deﬁning the function ˜ mt+1(a′,z) in Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 3 Consider the Bellman equation in (1) which can be written as
Vt(m,z) = max





′,z) = ˜ mt+1(z)a
′, ˜ mt+1(z) = max{zπt+1 − rt+1 − δ,0}λt + 1 + rt+1
The proof proceeds with a guess and verify strategy. Guess that the value function takes the
form Vt(m,z) = vt(z) + B logm, and substitute into the Bellman equation. In particular,
note that EVt(m′,z′) = Evt(z′) + B logm′. The ﬁrst order equation is
1
m − a′ = β
B





The Bellman equation becomes














Collecting the terms involving logm, we see that B = 1/(1 − β) and a′ = βm as claimed.￿
33Proof of Proposition 1 Consider ﬁrst the bond market clearing condition. Using (19) and
(20), we have that individual debt is dit+1 = (λt − 1)βmit if zit+1 ≥ zt+1 and dit+1 = −βmit






















Since kit = λt−1ait = λt−1βmit−1 if zit ≥ zt and zero otherwise, we have
 




Hence Yt = (πt/α)λt−1XtKt. Next, consider the labor market clearing condition. Integrating






Rearranging πt = α(λt−1Xt)α−1K
α−1
t L1−α and using it the expression for output Yt =
(λXt)αKα
t L1−α. Eliminating λt−1 using (49), we obtain (22). The law of motion for ag-





zitkitdi + (1 − δ)Kt
 
(53)






1−α + (1 − δ)Kt
 
, Zt = (λtXt)
α,
which is equation (23) in Proposition 1.￿
Proof of Proposition 2
Part (i): That τE
Xt = 0 follows directly from inspection of (16) and (26).



































































Subtracting (15) from both sides and rearranging, we obtain (28).￿
34Proof of Lemma 5 (LHS) We show in Appendix C that the saving policy function takes
the form ait+1 = st+1(zit+1)mit or kit+1 − dit+1 = st+1(zit+1)mit. Aggregating over all types:
Kt+1 = ¯ st+1Mt, C
E


























1 − ¯ st+1
1 − ¯ st+2
where the last equality uses that CE
t = (1 − ¯ st+1)Mt and Kt+1 = ¯ st+1Mt.￿
Proof of Proposition 3







1 − ¯ st+1




+ 1 − δ.
Combining with the deﬁnition of the entrepreneurial investment wedge (15) we obtain (39).














Xt) = β(1 − δ)(τXt+1 − τ
E
Xt+1) (55)
Substituting (54) into (55), we obtain (40).￿
Proof of Proposition 4 Denote the Lagrange multiplier on (6) by µit and that on the
















(1 + rt+1) + µit (57)
Multiply (56) by kit+1 and (57) by −dit+1 and add them
1
cit






The complementary slackness condition corresponding to (6) is µit[θkit+1 − dit+1] = 0 and
ψitkit+1 = 0. It can then be veriﬁed that this Euler equation is satisﬁed by kit+1ωit −dit+1 =
βmit and cit = (1 − β)mit where mit ≡ Rtkit + (1 − δ)ωitkit − (1 + rt)dit. Therefore
Ct = (1 − β)
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Combining (58) and (59) and using that Rt+1 = αYt+1/Kt+1, yields (41).
Proof of Lemma 6 The steps described here follow Shimer (2010). First, consider en-
trepreneurs who solve
Vt(l,d,ω) = max




c + ωx − d
′ = Al − wtl − (1 + rt)d, l
′ = (1 − δ)l + x, x ≥ 0, d
′ ≤ φAl
′
The envelope condition gives us the marginal value to an entrepreneur of having an extra
worker paid wt
Vlt(lit,dit,ωit) =
A + (1 − δ)ωit − wt
cit
. (60)
Next, consider workers. From their point of view, employment evolves exogenously as Lt+1 =
(1 − δ)Lt + ft(1 − Lt). Here ft is the probability of ﬁnding a job which is deﬁned by the
requirement that the number of workers ﬁnding jobs, ft(1 − Lt), is equal to the number of
workers recruited by ﬁrms
 
xitdi and hence ft =
 
xitdi/(1 − Lt). The value of a worker is
Wt(Lt) = u(wtLt) − v(Lt) + βWt+1[(1 − δ)Lt + ft(1 − Lt)]
The marginal value for workers at the equilibrium level of employment of having one worker









t + β(1 − δ − ft)W
′
t+1(Lt+1). (61)
Entrepreneurs are willing to pay all wages for which Vlt(lit,dit,ωit) ≥ 0 in (67). Workers
are willing to accept all wages for which W ′
t(Lt) ≥ 0 in (61). It is easy to see that a wage
satisfying the condition in Lemma 6 satisﬁes both requirements.￿
Proof of Lemma 7 Deﬁning “cash-on-hand” mit ≡ Alit+(1−δ)ωitlit−wtlit −(1+rt)dit,
the budget constraint of an entrepreneur becomes cit − dit+1 + ωitlit+1 = mit. The problem
of an entrepreneur can then be stated in recursive form as
V (m,ω) = max
l′,d′ log(m − ωl
′ + d





′ + (1 − δ)ω
′l
′ − wl




Following similar steps as in the proof of Lemma 3, entrepreneurs save a constant fraction
β of their cash-on-hand, mit, and hence their optimal labor choice satisﬁes (48).￿
36Proof of Proposition 5 The proposition follows directly from aggregating (48) across all
entrepreneurs.
B Alternative Modeling of Workers
We consider an extension where workers are allow to save in a risk-free asset and they face
shocks to their eﬃciency units of labor h. The recursive problem of a worker is summarized
by the Bellman equation:
V
W
t (a,h) = max







′ = wthl + (1 + rt)a
In the simulations presented in Figure 3 we consider a simple two state process for
the eﬃciency units of labor, h ∈ {0,1}, with transition probabilities [.2 .8;.05 .95]. In
addition, we assume that workers with zero eﬃciency units of labor receive a transfer equals
to 0.4wt. We interpret this model as roughly capturing an unemployment shock in a world
with unemployment insurance that oﬀers a 40% replacement ratio.
C Analysis of Economy with CRRA Preferences and
Persistent Shocks
In this appendix, we analyze the case with CRRA preferences. For sake of generality and to
show that the assumption of iid shocks in the main text is not crucial for our main results,
we also allow for persistence in the stochastic process of entrepreneurial productivity. In
particular, we assume that in each period entrepreneurs retain their productivity with prob-
ability γ. With the complementary probability 1−γ entrepreneurs draw a new productivity
from the distribution ψ(z).
C.1 Characterization of Individual’s Saving Problem








where mt+1(a′,z) = ˜ mt+1(z)a′, ˜ mt+1(z) = max{zπt+1 − rt+1 − δ,0}λt + 1 + rt+1.
The proof proceeds with a guess and verify strategy. Guess that the value function takes
37the form Vt(m,z) = vt(z)
m1−σ



































































This is a functional equation in vt(z) that can be solved numerically.
C.2 Evolution of the Wealth Density, Aggregate Capital and Pro-
ductivity










38Using Lemma 4 and integrating over all z we obtain a law of motion for aggregate capital
Kt+1 = γKt
 
st+1(z)˜ mt(z)ξt(z)dz + (1 − γ)¯ st+1 [αYt + (1 − δ)Kt]. (65)
There are two cases for which the model allows for a simple aggregation, given the evolution
of aggregate productivity Zt. First, if we assume that entrepreneurs’ productivity is iid over
time, equation C.2 specializes to
Kt+1 = ¯ st+1 [αYt + (1 − δ)Kt].
The second correspond to the case of log preferences. Using that st+1(z) = ¯ st+1 = β and
applying Lemma 4 to the ﬁrst term in the right hand side of equation C.2 we obtain a simple
equation describing the evolution of aggregate capital:
Kt+1 = β [αYt + (1 − δ)Kt].
While we can aggregate the model given the evolution of aggregate productivity, in the






aggregate productivity is a capital weighted average of entrepreneurs’ productivity
Zt =





Finally, the cutoﬀ is deﬁned by
λt−1(1 − Ξ(zt)) = 1.
D Generalized Nash Bargaining: Entrepreneur-Speciﬁc
Wage
Instead of a common wage, we could have worked with entrepreneur-speciﬁc wages that are
determined by Nash bargaining. We here derive these wages for completeness. The steps
described here follow Shimer (2010). We modify his derivations to allow for heterogeneity on
the side of employers. Let Vl(lit,dit,ωit,t) denote the marginal utility for entrepreneur i with
employment lit, debt dit, and recruitment cost, ωit of employing a worker at wage wit. Let
Wi({lit},t) denote the marginal utility for workers at the equilibrium level of employment of
having one worker employed at a wage wit in period t rather than unemployed.36.
36As shown below, this value depends on the entire distribution of employment, {lit}
39Consider ﬁrst the value of an entrepreneur which is given by
V (l,d,ω) = max




c + ωx − d
′ = Al − wtl − (1 + rt)d,
l
′ = (1 − δ)l + x, x ≥ 0, d
′ ≤ φAl
′




= βEVl(lit+1,dit+1,ωit+1,t + 1) (66)
and the envelope condition
Vl(lit,dit,ωit,t) =
At + (1 − δ)ωit − wit
cit
(67)
This is the marginal value to an entrepreneur of having an extra worker paid wit
Next, consider workers. Workers take as given the distribution of employment and its
evolution of employment. In particular, they take as given the (exogenous) job separation
rate δ and the (endogenous) probability of ﬁnding a job at ﬁrm i, fit. This job ﬁnding rate
is deﬁned by the requirement that the number of workers ﬁnding jobs, fit(1 − Lt), is equal
to the number of workers recruited by ﬁrms xit and hence fit = xit/(1−Lt). From the point
of view of workers employment then evolves as lit+1 = (1 − δ)lit + fit(1 − Lt). The value of







litdi + βEW({lit+1},t + 1)





− γ + β(1 − δ)EWi({lit+1},t + 1) − β
 
fjtEWj({lit+1},t + 1)dj (68)
Following the same analysis as in Shimer (2010), it can easily be shown that if wages are
determined by generalized Nash bargaining, the entrepreneur-speciﬁc wage wit satisﬁes
(1 − φ)Wi({lit},t)C
W
t = φVl(lit,dit,ωit,t)cit (69)




















t+1(1 − φ)EWj({lit+1},t + 1)dj
 
40Substitute in from (69)


















to eliminate Vl(lit+1,dit+1,ωit+1,t + 1) and (67) to eliminate Vl(lit,dit,ωit,t),



































































+ (1 − φ)γC
W
t
This is the Nash-bargaining solution. Note that wages are entrepreneur-speciﬁc because
of heterogeneity in recruitment costs, and also because ﬁnancing constraints imply that
consumption growth rates diﬀer across entrepreneurs.37
E Model with Homogenous Recruitment Costs and
Heterogenous Productivity
Consider the same model as in section 3 but where entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their
productivity, yit = zitlit, zit is drawn from ψ(z) iid over time and across entrepreneurs.
Everything remains unchanged except the budget constraint of an entrepreneur which now
is
cit + xit − dit+1 = zitlit − wtlit − (1 + rt)dit
The equilibrium has the feature that there is a productivity cutoﬀ for being active zt. Only
entrepreneurs who are above this cutoﬀ are active. Hence the equivalent of the suﬃcient
37Without heterogeneity and with perfect ﬁnancial markets (implying cit+1/cit = CW
t+1/CW
t ), the wage
would simply be wt = φ(A + fω) + (1 − φ)γCW
t .
















where the second equality follows because CW
t = wtLt. Deﬁning cash-on-hand mit = zitlit +
(1 − δ)lit − wtlit − (1 + r)dit and net worth ait+1 = lit+1 − dit+1, the Bellman equation of an
entrepreneur is
V (m,z) = max
a′,l′,d′ log(m − a


















Optimal labor choice therefore satisﬁes
lit+1 =
 
λ(zit+1)ait+1, zit+1 ≥ zt+1
0, zit+1 < zt+1
(70)
where zt+1 = wt+1 − 1 + δ. We can again show that the assumption of log-utility implies
that agents save a constant fraction of cash-on-hand, ait+1 = βmit or
lit+1 − dit+1 = β [zitlit + (1 − δ)lit − wtlit − (1 + r)dit] (71)










Hence the cutoﬀ, zt, is pinned down from
  ∞
zt λ(z)ψ(z)dz = 1. Aggregating over all en-
trepreneurs and using (70) gives









is TFP. Note that employment, and hence the labor wedge, only move because of movements
in TFP.
F Behavior of External Finance Relative to GDP
This section derives the eﬀect of a credit crunch in period 1 on the external ﬁnance to GDP
ratio in period 2 (the ﬁrst period where a credit crunch have an eﬀect on the economy), and


























































































































It is straightforward to see that the elasticity of external ﬁnance to GDP with respect to an
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